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In today's globalized world, companies are constantly exposed to changes in their environment. 
These changes can be highly diverse and serious. Changes in certain factors can affect the 
attractiveness of an industry and have an impact on the profitability of companies. Factors such 
as new competitors, capacity expansions, and a decline in demand can provoke overcapacity, 
leading to an unattractive industry. Overcapacity is a problem that frequently occurs in mature 
and capital -intensive industries, such as the chemical one. This typically results in increased 
competition and thus to reduced profitability for companies in the industry. Players who want 
to survive need to act against the declining profitability and transform to competitive 
companies. Literature and practice have shown that a joint venture can significantly improve 
the competitive position of companies and thus allow them to become profitable again.  
In order to combine literature and practice, the real-life example Lanxess was used to illustrate 
the emergence of overcapacity, its consequences and how to deal with them. Lanxess has 
achieved a successful transformation. A joint venture that helped Lanxess to integrate itself 
backwards and provide it with competitive prices for its raw materials, has been the main 
contributor to its success. As a result, Lanxess has successfully positioned itself and 
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No mundo globalizado de hoje, as empresas estão constantemente expostas a mudanças no 
ambiente em que estão inseridas. Essas mudanças podem ser bastante diversas e críticas. 
Mudanças em determinados fatores podem afetar a atratividade de uma indústria e ter impacto 
na lucratividade das empresas. Fatores como novos competidores, expansões de capacidade e 
declínio na procura podem provocar um excesso de capacidade, o que pode formar uma 
indústria pouco atraente. O excesso de capacidade é um problema que frequentemente ocorre 
em indústrias desenvolvidas e indústrias de capital intensivo, como a indústria química. Isto 
normalmente leva ao aumento da concorrência e, portanto, à redução da lucratividade das 
empresas do setor. Aqueles que querem sobreviver precisam de agir contra a diminuição da 
lucratividade e transformar-se em empresas competitivas. A literatura e a prática mostraram 
que uma joint venture pode melhorar significativamente a posição competitiva das empresas e, 
deste modo, permitir que elas voltem a ter lucro. 
Para associar a literatura existente e a prática, o exemplo real da Lanxess foi usado com o 
objetivo de demonstrar o surgimento do excesso de capacidade, as suas consequências e como 
lidar com as mesmas. A Lanxess conseguiu uma transformação bem-sucedida. Uma joint 
venture que ajudou a Lanxess a integrar-se ao contrário e a oferecer preços competitivos para 
as suas matérias-primas, foi o principal factor para o seu sucesso. Por este motivo, a Lanxess 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
In an increasingly globalized world, companies have to observe changes in their industry and 
the environment continuously. Changes can include the sudden occurrence of new competitors, 
new technologies or price changes. These can lead to shifts in the supply and procurement side 
and ultimately to structural changes in the industry. Such developments can intensify 
competition on a sustained basis. Companies that want to stay in the market have to react 
quickly in order to keep up with their competitors and remain profitable. This can include 
strategic measures that lead to a better positioning of vis-à-vis competitors. 
 
Scholars and companies have examined how certain alterations of factors can influence the 
attractiveness of industries. The frameworks of Porter’s five forces and the General Electrics 
and McKinsey matrix (Hax & Majluf, 1983), have been particularly investigating this topic. 
Porter (2008) argues that a raise in capacity results in increased competition and thus reduces 
profitability, leading to the industry’s deterioration of attractiveness. Gulati et al (2000) and 
Kogut (1988), identified that a joint venture can be seen as a strategic behaviour. An improved 
positioning can be associated with a joint venture in a highly competitive industry and improve 
the company's profitability. 
 
The problem this thesis strives to understand is how companies can act when they face an 
increase in the capacity of an industry. In order to find a solution, the following research 
questions will be answered: 
 
1. How can industry attractiveness be assessed and what are the key influencing factors?   
2. Why does overcapacity reduce the attractiveness of industries? 
3. What measures can be taken to counter the negative consequences of overcapacity? 
 
A real-life example will be used in order to demonstrate how a company that faced overcapacity 
in the industry managed to successfully transform itself. Lanxess suffered a decline in 
profitability due to overcapacity and imposed a three-stage program as a result. Whereas the 
first stage included measures to create a more efficient organizational structure, the second one 
dealt with the optimization of processes and plant closures. Particular focus will be given to the 
joint venture in the third stage, which ensured the success in strengthening its competitive 
position and returning to profitability. 
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This work is structured in four parts. The first part covers the literature review, where industry 
attractiveness frameworks and threats to industry profitability are presented. Secondly, 
overcapacity, its consequences, and options to deal with it are discussed. The second part of the 
thesis comprises the teaching case, in which the successful transformation of Lanxess is 
presented. The third part includes the teaching notes, which serves as a guideline for the 
instructor to discuss the case in class. The fourth part provides the main conclusion of this thesis 




CHAPTER 2: Literature Review  
 
The literature review presents several academic topics in order to provide a theoretical basis for 
the case study. It discusses the two major topics: industry attractiveness and overcapacity. 
 
2.1 Industry attractiveness 
 
Industry attractiveness frameworks  
Scholars have developed frameworks to analyse the attractiveness of industries. The most 
known one was developed by Michael E. Porter: Porter’s five forces. The five forces that shape 
industry competition and profitability are shown in figure 1 (Porter, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1: Porter's five forces 
Source: Porter, 2008 
 
Whereas the industry attractiveness - business strength matrix of General Electric (GE) and 





Figure 2: GE and McKinsey matrix 
Source: McKinsey&Company, 2008 
 
These external factors cannot be controlled by the firms. These include market size, market 
growth rate, cyclically, competitive structure, barriers to entry, industry profitability, 
technology, inflation, regulation, manpower availability, social issues, environmental issues, 
political issues, and legal issues (Hax & Majluf, 1983). Several factors such as barriers to entry, 
industry profitability and competitive structure do overlap with considerations of Porter. 
Compared to Porter, the GE and McKinsey matrix divides the factors into two groups (Hax & 
Majluf, 1983). One group includes factors that affect companies and competitors in the industry 
equally, such as industry profitability or market growth rate. The second group includes factors 
that affect all participants differently, such as demographic factors or currency parity (Hax & 
Majluf, 1983). Furthermore, in contrast to Porter, it is determined how much the factors will 
contribute to the attractiveness of the industry by grading them according to a five-point scale 
(Hax & Majluf, 1983). Finally, the factors are categorized according to the three levels high, 
medium and low.  
 
However, in the study of Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1986), the conventional business 
portfolio planning techniques are criticised. While these techniques consider industry 
attractiveness as a universal dimension, the two scholars are determining the attractiveness on 
the basis of relative advantages. They suggest that the cost position of the individual firms 
affects the industry’s profitability. Andrews (1971, as cited in Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 
1986) admits, that the success of these business portfolio planning tools is due to its simplicity. 
However, he argues against Porter and the GE and McKinsey matrix and proposes that the 
attractiveness of an industry depends on the nature of a company's resources.  
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Dyer and Singh (1998) introduced a whole new concept analysing the firm’s competitive 
advantage and profitability. It is no longer only the individual company that is considered in 
the analysis as e.g. Porter does, but the connections in which this company stands. The 
profitability and competitive advantage are based on the firm’s alliances. This can be achieved, 
among other things, through complementary resource endowments. The importance of strategic 
network as part of the competition and profitability is also emphasized by Gulati, Nohria, and 
Zaheer (2000). This is an important complement and extent to the existing frameworks of Porter 
and GE and McKinsey. The following threats to profitability are derived from these 
frameworks. 
 
Threats to industry profitability  
According to Porter (2008), the threat of entry represents a danger to profitability. The capacity 
in the industry raises by increasing the number of players which seek for market share. Another 
reason for an increased industry capacity is derived by the buyer’s backwards diversification in 
the supply chain, if the profitability of the sellers it too high (Porter, 2008). Consequentially, 
prices, costs, and the required amount of investment to compete in the industry are under 
pressure. Prevailing capabilities and cash flows can be used to disturb competition especially 
by new players which are diversifying from other markets (Porter, 2008). This force can limit 
the profit potential. Particularly when it’s high, existing players must keep prices down and 
push investments in order to frighten new entrants. Current players are likely to drop prices as 
they have to defend their market share at any price. Porter emphasises, that it is not the entrance 
that matters, but the threat, that lowers profitability. Gulati et al. (2000) consider the threat of 
entry as a danger to profitability as well. Although they regard network ties as entry barriers in 
the industry. Structural network characteristics such as network density have an influence on 
profitability. Connections to low-cost suppliers can hinder or limit other firms to access those 
and therefore allow them to receive higher returns. Hence, the profitability in an industry can 
also be affected by the prevailing networks (Gulati et al., 2000).  
The extent to which rivalry limits the profitability depends on the intensity and basis of the 
competition (Porter, 2008). The degree of intensity, among others, is high when the number of 
competitors is high or when they are similar in size and power. The need for large capacity 
expansions due to high rivalry, upsets the balance between supply and demand in the industry 
and often results in long and recurring periods of overcapacity and price cuts. However, rivalry 
is typically getting more intense when time passes and as industries mature the growth slows 




Frameworks to assess industry attractiveness have shown that overcapacity threatens the 
profitability. In this sense, overcapacity has the right to be analysed more closely. This section 
discusses the implications of overcapacity. Building on this, options are discussed on how to 
deal with the negative consequences of overcapacity, with particular emphasis on joint 
ventures. 
 
Implications of overcapacity  
In the scope of this work, overcapacity is also referred to as excess capacity. Overcapacity and 
poor returns are often results of companies that tend to plan their capacity expansions poorly 
by investing at the same time as their competitors (Henderson & Cool, 2003). Industry-wide 
optimism that develops due to tight industry capacity utilization and good cash flows, is often 
the main reason for investments in new capacity (Achi et al., 1996 as cited in Henderson & 
Cool, 2003). Considerable sales potential can arise from investments in plants. However, if too 
many companies are investing at the same time, this would result in overcapacity (Henderson 
& Cool, 2003).  
 
Henderson and Cool (2003), Bower (2011) and Schuler et al. (2014) agree that overcapacity is 
common in older capital-intensive industries such as automotive, steel, and petrochemical. The 
overcapacity and low margins in the steel industry resulted from “a combination of 
overinvestment, a slowdown in fixed asset investment, the global economic crisis, and changes 
in the raw-materials pricing schemes” (Schuler et al., p.2, 2014). A typical situation where 
overcapacities are present is when the environment is competitive. In particular, two processes 
play a role here (Porter, 1980). There are a number of existing companies that have the resources 
and strength to add capacity in order to maintain market power. In the second process, new 
players add capacity that strive for a good market position (Porter, 1980).  
 
The negative consequence of excess capacity is that firms that suffer from it tend to lower the 
price in order to sell more of its capacity and to attract new businesses (Kim, Shi, & Srinivasan, 
2004; Grant, p.73, 2016). The competitors that are afraid of being undersold tend to charge a 
lower price as well. As a result, these industries are subject to intense price competition in times 
of low demand (Kim et al., 2004). This typically happens in commodity industries and is the 
reason for dramatic drops in profitability (Grant, p.73, 2016). Porter (2008) agrees that 
overcapacity can considerably intensify the competition, cut prices and therefore considerably 
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affect the profitability. This has been the case in the steel industry where overcapacity had a 
considerable influence on profitability and EBITDA (Schuler et al., 2014). It was shown that 
there is a clear inverse relationship between overcapacity and profitability. Moreover, 
overcapacity negates the targeted added value of companies (Henderson & Cool, 2003), it leads 
to long-term value destruction (Schuler et al., 2014) and most often endures for a long time 
(Porter, 1980). The next section examines options to deal with overcapacity, focusing on the 
relative merits of joint ventures (JVs).  
 
Characteristics of joint venture 
Practice and literature have shown that JVs can be used in order to improve competitive 
positioning and thus return to profitability. In this context, scholars have made an effort in 
investigating how JVs can be used to improve the competitiveness of firms and receive a 
competitive advantage (Tong & Reuer, 2010). As already mentioned, firms that are operating 
in industries that show overcapacity often suffer from increased competition and decreased 
profitability. In this situation firms face the pressure of consolidation (Porter, 2008) and a joint 
venture may relieve this pressure.  
JV is a type of strategic alliance, such as licensing agreements, distribution and supply 
agreements, research and development partnerships, and technical exchanges (Inkpen & 
Currall, 2004). The activities covered by strategic alliances are very diverse, including buyer-
supplier partnerships or shared manufacturing agreements (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). 
Equity JVs pools the resources of more than one company to create a new organizational unit. 
This unit is considered as the child that is different from its parents (Inkpen & Currall, 2004), 
manages assets together and achieves strategic objectives (Yin & Shanley, 2008). Further, it 
can be distinguished between horizontal and vertical JVs, whereas vertical ones are bringing 
together companies operating in different but vertically related sectors (Oxley, Sampson, & 
Silverman, 2009). However, there is little harmony among scholars on the types of alliances, 
which is reflected in the wide range of typologies proposed in research on alliances and JVs 
(Yin & Shanley, 2008). 
 
Reasons to engage in a joint venture 
As overcapacity poses pressure on competition and profitability, companies face the need to act 
in the right way (Sanders et al., 2015). Restructuring is a process of strategic choice and is 
driven by maximizing value, transforming a weak company or increasing the value of a strong 
business (Hurry, 1993). Besides Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), part of this process can be 
the involvement of partners in new alliances. As global competitiveness changes over time, the 
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patterns in restructuring may change as well. The history of automotive restructuring reveals 
that alliances became more and more popular vis-à-vis to M&As. JVs and vertical integration 
in order to access raw material, became the centre of attention (Hurry, 1993). Since alliances 
have been established in practice, it has been of great interest to scientists to investigate how 
they can improve the profitability of companies (Oxley et al., 2009). 
One of the first scholars were Porter and Fuller, which posited that the benefits of alliances 
include learning, access to specialised resources, risk sharing, and the design of the competition 
(Porter & Fuller, 1986 as cited in Oxley et al., 2009). As already mentioned, according to Dyer 
and Singh (1998) alliances can be the source of competitive advantage and profitability. 
Especially, the complementary resource endowments allow to earn abnormal profits. 
In the literature, the strategic point of view is strongly mentioned with regard to alliances. That 
is, JVs have a strategic significance for companies and provide access, among other things, to 
resources (Gulati et al., 2000). For instance, a strong relational tie to suppliers can clearly 
contribute to profitability as shown in the Japanese automotive industry (Cusumano, 1985 as 
cited in Gulati et al., 2000). Another example is container shipping companies which could 
benefit from the added value through synergies created by alliances, e.g. in joint procurement 
(Sanders et al., 2015).   
Kogut (1988) presents strategic behaviour as one of the three approaches that explain the 
motivation for JV and why it is chosen over alternatives such as acquisitions, supply contract, 
licensing, or spot market purchase. Strategic behaviour means that companies will act in a way 
that maximizes their profits by improving their competitive position vis-à-vis competitors. JVs 
might be more costly but more profitable compared to other alternatives. Kogut (1988) explains 
that, potentially, any model of imperfect competition that explains vertical integration is 
applicable to JVs since it deprives competitors of raw materials. JV partners are selected to 
improve the competitive position, that happens either through collusion or by hindering other 
competitors to find a strong partner (Kogut, 1988).  
Another way of investigating JVs is to examine the industry closely, especially in terms of 
market power and efficiency (Kogut, 1988; Fusfeld, 1958; Hagedoorn, 1993). It was found that 
strategic behaviour improves both market power and efficiency. The efficiency improvements 
yield from the cost reduction that results from a better competitive position. The improvements 
in market power aim to create monopoly rents (Schwartz, 1987). With respect to vertical 
alliances, the efficiency benefits are due to the deepened specialisation, learning by doing and 
reduction of information asymmetry in the non-horizontal chain (Reuer & Koza, 2000; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998).  
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Moreover, scholars have tried to explain the motivation for JVs by increased profitability for 
the parents (Kogut, 1988). McConnell and Nantell (1985) came to the conclusion that JVs were 
conducted to improve efficiency as they identified in their study that the parents' stock returns 
had improved. More specifically, the stock return of the smaller partner was greater whereas 
the average cash gain was equally distributed.  
However, Tong and Reuer (2010) found in their studies that non-horizontal JVs improve 
industry competition and reduce industry profitability, which is in align with Duncan (1982). 
This effect is stronger for international industries than for domestic and for concentrated ones. 
Moreover, Tong and Reuer (2010) emphasises that an increased firm performance does not 
necessarily result from an increased firm competitiveness. It may be that such companies that 
are engaged in a joint venture have weakened competition in the industry. Gulati et al. (2000) 
also considers negative sides from another point of view. Strategic networks such as JVs can 
tie companies to unproductive relationships or rule out the partnership with other viable 
companies. Thus, JVs can represent not only opportunities but also constraints.  
Conclusively, strategic behaviour serves an informative framework for investigating how JVs 
influence the competitive positioning of a firm (Kogut, 1988). However, negative effects may 
also be associated with a JV.  
 
Relative merits of joint venture  
M&As are often used as a mean to reduce capacity and duplication in industries that suffer from 
overcapacity (Bower, 2011; Schuler et al., 2014). However, reducing overcapacity by closing 
inefficient facilities through M&As only works if real synergies are created, which makes the 
new company more efficient and profitable (Schuler et al., 2014). Porter (2008) agrees that 
M&As are not always the best decision. He emphasises that the strategy of eliminating 
competitors and stop intense competition can be risky. Porter’s five forces teach that the decline 
in profits due to the removal of current rivals frequently attracts new players and causes 
setbacks from customers and suppliers. New players could in return increase the capacity in the 
industry again.  
The decision whether to engage in a M&A or alliance is complex and the context of the firms 
plays a major role (Yin & Shanley, 2008). M&As typically have ownership control of all the 
assets which is missing in alliances. This implies that M&As are preferred where uniform 
ownership and control rights allow more extensive use of common organisational resources 
than otherwise possible (Yin & Shanley, 2008). This exploitation is at the expense of higher 
investments. Alliances generally do not allow such intensive use of shared assets as M&As, but 
they are easier to leave when needed and they benefit from lower costs of sharing power. 
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Hennart (1991), agrees by saying that JVs represent a good alternative to full acquisitions or 
replication as it is less expensive. Moreover, Dyer suggests that under market uncertainty 
alliances are preferred as they limit their exposure compared to M&As (Dyer et al., 2004 as 
cited in Shanley & Yin, 2015). Hence, the risk sharing, the flexibility, and the lower costs are 
in favour of alliances compared to M&As.  
Alliances are also preferred where continuous cooperation between partners is advantageous 
and where centralised control could compromise cooperation and destroy the value of a 
combination (Yin & Shanley, 2008). Yin and Sahnley also found that mature manufacturing 
industries, such as petrochemicals, characterized by high requirements for commitment, low 
requirements for flexibility, and high structural and institutional constraints might be in favour 
of JVs than any other type of alliance.  
 
Capron and Mitchell (2010) developed a framework which takes those considerations into 
account, starting their analysis at an earlier stage. Thereby it is possible to find out the best way 
for growth through resource developing. The steps that need to be taken can be retrieved from 
figure 3. An alliance is preferred over an acquisition if the existing resources of the company 
are not relevant to the ones desired, it is not easy to agree with the provider on the value of the 
resource and to generate the wanted resources, does require the participation of only a few 
people and units (Capron & Mitchell, 2010).  
However, the literature does not provide several concepts to assess whether a M&A or alliance 




Figure 3: Finding the right path  
Source: Capron & Mitchell, 2010 
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CHAPTER 3: Case Study 
 
Matthias Zachert was appointed CEO of Lanxess AG on April 1, 2014.1 At that time Lanxess 
faced a dramatic decline in profitability, especially in the rubber segment. Zachert had been 
forced to act.2 Therefore, he hired the consulting company EX to draw up a restructuring plan. 
During 2014 and 2015, several steps of the three-stage restructuring plan had already been 
successfully implemented. The first phase focused on the competitiveness of the business and 
administrative structure resulted, among other things, in a simplified organizational structure 
and a smaller number of business units.3 The second phase focused on the operational 
competitiveness and reduced production capacities, for example.4 However, the big step was 
yet to come. On 15 September 2015, Zachert received a proposal to engage in a Joint Venture 
(JV) with Saudi Aramco from the transaction department of EX, besides all the other steps of 
the efficiency program. Saudi Aramco as the world's largest oil and energy company can thus 
offer access to the important raw material oil.5 Saudi Aramco set a time limit of 1 week for 
Lanxess to decide whether they wanted to engage. Only 1 week! After 6 long days of careful 
deliberations, Zachert opted for a 50:50 JV with Saudi Aramco which was announced in 
Cologne, Germany, on 22 September 2015.6 After the announcement he sat in front of his 
computer and read the global press release about the JV asking himself: Was this the right 
decision?    
	
3.1 Lanxess background and history from 2005-2012  
 
Zachert looked back to Lanxess, a speciality chemicals company based in Cologne (Germany), 
that emerged at the beginning of 2005 from a strategic realignment of the Bayer Group's 
chemicals and plastics businesses. In the same year, the shares of the companies were admitted 
to the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and to the MDAX and in 2012 to the DAX 30.7 Moreover, 
Lanxess was included in the leading sustainability indices Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
(DJSI World and Europe) and FTSE4Good.8 The global petrochemical company distinguished 
itself from its competitors by flexible asset structures, a diversified customer base, a global 
presence, and an entrepreneurial management structure.9  
Lanxess elaborated its core business as the development, manufacturing and sale of plastics, 
rubber, specialty chemicals, and intermediates.10 Synthetic rubber is the name given to elastic 
polymers produced on the basis of petrochemical raw materials. Synthetic rubber is the starting 
material for rubber production.11 Lanxess high-performance rubbers are used primarily in the 
production of tires and technical applications such as hoses, belts, and seals. The main 
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customers are companies from the automotive and tire industries, but also companies from the 
construction industry and the oil and gas industry.12 From the outset, Lanxess has applied its 
specific core competencies of application know-how, chemical expertise, flexible asset 
management and close cooperation with its customers.13 In March 2009, Lanxess celebrated 
100 years of synthetic rubber (SR) since its invention by the former Bayer Group employee 
Hofmann. With a portfolio of more than 100 types of synthetic rubber, Lanxess built on 
Hofmann's heritage to bring it into a successful future. In honour of his invention, Lanxess has 
decided to undertake a number of activities at its rubber sites around the world.14 
Despite the financial crisis, Lanxess was named "Company of the Year" by ICIS (International 
Chemical Information System) in 2009 for its outstanding financial performance in 2008. On 
1st in February 2010, the opening price of Lanxess stock was EUR 27.42. This was an increase 
of 74% compared to the first price of EUR 15.75 in 2005. From the perspective of 2012, 
Lanxess continued its path of growth and achieved record sales and earnings in 2011. EBITDA 
increased by 25% to EUR 1,146 million. This was remarkable as EUR 1 billion was exceeded 
for the first time.15  
Thanks to Lanxess's global production network and long-standing customer relationships, the 
company was particularly well positioned with its SR activities.16 It is of vast importance for 
the SR industry to have a reliable, sufficient and secure supply and competitive prices in raw 
materials.17 The market for oil is the feedstock for petrochemical products. When it comes to 
SR, the feedstock accounts for 75% of the total production costs in addition to energy.18  
 
3.2 Development of the world synthetic rubber industry until 2013  
 
In order to understand the causes of Lanxess’s problems, Zachert took a close look at the 
industry. He observed that although the chemical industry was highly mature, it was still a 
growing industry. It achieved growth rates worldwide, some of which were significantly higher 
than the general growth of the global economy. Nevertheless, it was increasingly challenging 
for European chemical companies, in particular, to profit from these fundamentally positive 
conditions in the medium term. This was due to far-reaching processes of change, some of 
which have taken place over decades in established market structures and mechanisms. These 
processes of change took place in the industry, such as substantial investments or changes in 
raw material prices.19 Change was not an unknown phenomenon in the chemical industry. Over 
the last century, the industry has shown its ability and willingness to change. In this way, the 
chemical industry was able to play a decisive role in shaping technical and social progress or 
even make it possible.20 Zachert noted that changes have occurred mainly in the global rubber 
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market, especially on the supply and procurement side. However, the structural problems of the 
industry were in the market and not in the product itself.21  
 
Investments in capacity 
The commissioning of large new plants for SR has created overcapacities in the market. This 
has intensified the already existing price pressure worldwide.22 Since its foundation, Lanxess 
has invested heavily in the production of SR to meet growing demand. The first step was the 
capacity expansion of the rubber additives facility in India in 2006. One year later the expansion 
of SR worldwide continued, in particular by expanding capacity of plants in Canada. As a result, 
the capacity for SR was increased by 42%. This was followed in 2008 by the purchase of 
Petroflex S.A., one of the world's largest manufacturers of SR (Exhibit 1). This complemented 
Lanxess's product portfolio and improved the company's position in one of the world's most 
important growth markets. In the following year, Lanxess strengthened its presence in Russia 
and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) markets. In these markets, Lanxess 
increasingly marketed high-performance rubber.23 Axel C. Heitmann (former Chairman of the 
Board of Management) said, that the “commitment to Russia represents a major step in the 
long-term growth strategy of our company, especially in the BRIC countries, which already 
account for about 15 percent of Group sales”24. Since 2010, Lanxess has had a new production 
facility in India, which supplied the global rubber market and the growing tire and rubber 
industry in India. Two acquisitions were made in the following year. With the acquisition of 
DSM Elastomers in the Netherlands and Darmex S.A. in Argentina, Lanxess further 
strengthened its position as the world's leading SR company. In 2012, Lanxess and the 
Taiwanese TSRC Corporation established a 50:50 JV in Greater China. The two companies 
were jointly investing USD 50 million in a new SR plant. One year later, a new production 
facility for SR in Singapore was completed. At EUR 400 million, this represented the largest 
single investment in its history in Singapore. Further, Lanxess opened its first production 
facility in Russia in the same year. Rubber for the markets in Russia and the CIS, especially for 
the automotive and tire industries, was produced there.25  
 
Competitive raw material prices and continuous cost optimization 
There were also changes in the industry with regard to the cost position of companies. Access 
to competitive raw material prices and continuous cost optimization became increasingly 
decisive. Producers from emerging markets, the Middle East and the USA were able to benefit 
from cost advantages in the price-sensitive SR business. Those countries often had better access 
to cheaper raw materials and energy.26 As a result, the European chemical industry and thus 
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also Lanxess suffered ever greater cost disadvantages. In addition to the already higher wage 
costs in the European Union (EU), the costs for raw materials and energy supply had risen 
disproportionately.27 This could not be compensated by higher efficiency and German 
companies were particularly hit by this development.28 In 2013, German companies have paid 
22% more for electricity costs than the average in the EU.29  
 
Pressure on the European chemical industry 
The European chemical industry also came under increasing pressure due to the continuous 
expansion of production capacities worldwide. Especially expanding competitors from Asia 
and China contributed to this development. In addition, producers from the USA and the Middle 
East also penetrated the world markets with low prices. This penetration even applied to higher-
quality products. As a result, these countries switched from importers to exporters, which led 
to a decline in export opportunities for European companies in the global growth regions.30   
	
New technologies and competitors	
New technologies and competitors have also changed the market conditions lastingly. State-
owned or at least supported suppliers from emerging markets penetrated established markets. 
In doing so, they often did not only pursue economic goals, which reduced the pressure to make 
a profit. These competitors were often former customers of Lanxess. Instead of buying from 
them, they now competed against Lanxess. Furthermore, the USA had increasingly better 
access to shale gas in the USA resulting in lower energy costs. Both developments increased 
import pressure on the European markets.31 
	
The main growth market China 
On the demand side, changes in the market have already been observed. It has become more 
and more clear that China would remain the main growth market in the future. Through 2030 
it was expected that 40% of the worldwide demand for chemicals would come from China, but 
a significant part of this would be served from the domestic market. In the future, producers 
would not only have to set up individual plants but complete value chains in order to profit from 
this growth.32 
	
Focus on innovation 
Furthermore, the focus on innovation in the industry has increasingly shifted to another level. 
The concentration was no longer on molecules but on applications and processes. In the past, 
innovation was defined as new chemical compounds with improved or new properties. This 
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changed due to the enormous scientific progress and the high costs associated with registering 
new substances. Chemical companies had to focus on new areas of application for established 
products and try to make production processes safer and more efficient.33 
 
Environmental awareness 
After all, environmental awareness has increased more and more in recent years. Companies 
are forced to raise the standards for sustainable production to meet regulatory requirements. 
This can be remedied by consolidations. In particular as competitors in the growth markets are 
not able to raise the necessary investments for this.34 
 
3.3 World synthetic rubber industry in 2013 and 2014 
 
For Lanxess the year 2013 was challenging. It was characterized by a weak economic market 
environment, particularly in Europe. Volatile raw material prices and increasing competition, 
partly due to the new producers, had a negative impact on business development. Especially 
the synthetic rubber business suffered from those developments (Exhibit 2) with a continuing 
weakness of demand as already shown in 2012. In addition, the effects of a supply overhang 
triggered by higher production capacities became visible in the rubber business in 2013. The 
decline in sales is attributable to declining sales prices due to increasing competition, especially 
for rubber products. Furthermore, the price development followed the declining raw material 
prices. For 2014, the market situation for synthetic rubber was expected to remain challenging 
in view of the competitive and capacity situation. Even stronger price competition and more 
overcapacity could result from new producers or capacities. Risks could also arise here due to 
the dependence of the rubber business on the tire and automotive industries, which lead to 
volatility in sales.35 As expected, the year 2014 continued to be characterized by overcapacities 
combined with price pressure, a cost structure with only limited competitiveness and high 
investment obligations. As a result, no further major investments were planned for the 
construction of new production facilities in the following years, as idling and start-up costs also 
had to be taken into account. It also had to be assumed that procurement costs for petrochemical 
raw materials, which are essential for the synthetic rubber products, would remain volatile.36 
 
In order to better understand the situation in the rubber business, Zachert analysed it more 
closely. Structural changes in pricing developed because, in addition to new suppliers, 
established suppliers also expanded existing capacities in the rubber business, to which Lanxess 
itself made a significant contribution.37 By 2014, there was already production overcapacity of 
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around 20% in the rubber business.38 Increased supply flows of rubber from Asia and USA 
increased price pressure as well. The success of investments in Asia was therefore severely 
influenced by the difficult competitive market conditions for SR.39 Moreover, the 
underutilization of production facilities led to rising costs for unused capacity in Asia.40 So one 
can say, growing capacities led to increasing price pressure, while at the same time the 
competitive position vis-à-vis American producers, who have a more favourable raw material 
and energy supply due to shale gas, deteriorated. These changes resulted in a significant decline 
in business. All regions were affected by sales declines. The most robust region was 
Asia/Pacific, which was able to outperform the other reporting regions with a low single-digit 
percentage decline.41 
 
As Zachert analysed the year 2013, he observed only negative developments in terms of 
numbers. Lanxess suffered a significant 8.7% decline in sales, mainly due to lower prices, with 
all regions falling short of the prior-year level (Exhibit 3). Further, EBITDA pre exceptionals 
decreased by about 40% to EUR 735 million and the EBITDA margin pre exceptionals 
decreased to 8.9% (previously 13.4%). The changes in the competitive environment for the 
rubber business resulted in impairment charges of EUR 257 million. These write-downs 
resulted in a net loss of EUR 159 million. The performance of the Lanxess shares has also 
declined significantly (Exhibit 4).42 
Revenues in 2014 continued to fall by 3.5%. EBITDA pre exceptionals, on the other hand, rose 
by almost 10% from EUR 735 million in the previous year to EUR 808 million in 2014. 
Moreover, the EBITDA margin pre exceptionals increased to 10.1%. However, earnings were 
negatively impacted by low selling prices due to the challenging competitive situation for 
synthetic rubbers, partly as a result of overcapacities. The performance of Lanxess stock 
continued to decline considerably as in the previous year. Further, rating agencies have 
downgraded creditworthiness, partly because of the recent weaker financial ratios as a result of 
the persistently difficult business environment in the rubber sector.43  
 
3.4 Steps taken by Lanxess 2014-2017 
 
After carefully and self-critically analysing the challenging year 2013 and the first quarters of 
2014, Zachert knew he had to act. In response, Zachert and his team launched the three-stage 
efficiency program "Let's LANXESS again" in 2014 (Exhibit 5) with the objective to become 
more competitive and profitable.44  
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We have been working at full steam over the past few months to create the foundation for our 
realignment. We, as a team, will significantly improve our competitiveness by systematically 
implementing our program. We have started talks with the employee representatives on the 
implementation process, and we expect to quickly reach constructive solutions 45, 
said Matthias Zachert, Chairman of the Board of Management of Lanxess AG. 
 
Phase I 
Phase I focused on the competitiveness of the business and administrative structure. As part of 
the first step, the number of business units from 14 to 10 were consolidated effective January 
1st, 2015. The reasons for this were intersections in the customer structure, regional overlaps in 
the established markets, and additions in the emerging markets. It should also provide access 
to new customers and markets. The responsible employee representatives were involved in the 
process. Zachert has also streamlined the administration through global cross-functional 
headcount reductions and the consolidation of group functions. With a more efficient 
organizational structure, Lanxess did not only promote their proximity to the market and 
customers but also sustainably improve their cost position. Moreover, a reduction of around 
1,000 of the 17,000 jobs worldwide was realized.46 Conclusively, the measures included a 
simplified organizational structure, a smaller number of business units, the reduction of 
overlaps in customers and regional markets, staff reductions and the consolidation of 
administrative functions. These measures in the short-term served to finance the realignment.47  
 
Phase II 
Phase II was dedicated to the operational competitiveness with two excellence initiatives. In a 
"production optimization initiative", temporary or permanent plant shutdowns, as well as all 
production processes, were examined. Moreover, the goal was to implement best-practice 
approaches as comprehensively as possible. Another initiative was focusing on the optimization 
of sales and supply chain.48 In summary, Lanxess has adjusted its production capacity, 
especially for the SR segment. Plants were closed, some permanently other temporarily. 
Facilities were sold, and operational processes were improved at the remaining sites. To align 
capacity with demand, sales, distribution and value chain functions were improved through 
automated order processing. This enabled management to have a better demand transparency 
and efficiency in the value chain.49 In the medium-term, these initiatives were expected to save 





Phase III concentrated on the competitiveness of the business portfolio. The focus was on 
improving access to raw materials and sales markets, also through strategic partnerships. One 
possible option was to secure the long-term supply of important raw materials through vertical 
cooperation with a company from the petrochemical industry and thus strengthen the cost 
position.51  
On 22 September 2015, Zachert announced that Lanxess and Saudi Aramco would enter into a 
JV for synthetic rubber. The world's largest producer of synthetic rubber and the world's largest 
oil and energy group were thus entering into a strategic alliance. The joint venture was valued 
at EUR 2.75 billion. 52 Saudi Aramco has an unbeatable cost advantage by having access to the 
world's largest and most accessible oil and gas reserves and the associated ownership of low-
cost natural resources.53 Lanxess contributed its rubber business and Saudi Aramco provided 
competitive and reliable access to strategic raw materials in the medium term. Zachert said “this 
alliance will enable us to give the rubber business a very strong competitive position and the 
best possible future perspectives” 54. Both companies each hold 50% of the EUR 2.75 billion 
JV, which is consolidated at Lanxess. Saudi Aramco paid for its 50 percent stake, approximately 
EUR 1.2 billion, in cash. Zachert planned to use the proceeds for debt reduction, a share 
buyback program and growth investment.55 The rubber JV between Lanxess and Saudi Aramco 
began operations on April 1st in 2016 under the name Arlanxeo after the relevant antitrust 
authorities approved the transaction. The JV was created for the development, production, 
marketing and sale of SR.56  
Zachert’s opinion was that Lanxess can only remain sustainable with synthetic rubber products 
if they were just as strongly positioned as their competitors. And most of them were backward 
integrated, i.e. they produce the necessary raw materials for the rubber themselves. Through the 
JV, Lanxess integrated itself backward for the first time. This finally remedied the weakness of 
limited access to important raw materials. In a material-intensive business such as rubber 
production, more favourable purchasing conditions mean noticeably lower manufacturing costs 
- and thus greater price competitiveness on the sales side.57   
 
 3.5 Would the plan work?  
 
Zachert had deliberately chosen the joint venture. But typically, when it comes to investments, 




Phase I and II 
In 2015, the rating agencies Standard & Poor's and Moody's have raised its outlook for Lanxess 
and commented positively on their measures.58 At the beginning of 2017, Zachert looked back 
on the well-developed year 2016. He noted that phase I not only improved market and customer 
proximity, but also the cost position over the long term. Lanxess achieved annual savings of 
around EUR 150 million already in 2015 and was thus able to benefit from the savings earlier 
than expected. With regard to phase II, Lanxess has also made progress in optimising its 
production sites faster than planned. This was possible because some measures already could 
be completed in 2016 instead of 2017.59  
 
Phase III 
The JV with Saudi Aramco made it possible to initiate the growth phase at Lanxess already in 
2016. EBITDA pre exceptionals were EUR 995 million, the third consecutive increase. Lanxess 
had previously forecast earnings of between EUR 880 million and EUR 930 million. In 
addition, for the year 2016 as a whole, the Lanxess share achieved a price gain of around 46%. 
Lanxess also increased dividend payments in 2016. The dividend increase of 17 % was a sign 
of the Group's increased profitability and financial soundness.60 In addition, as of 2016, the JV 
contributed around 35% to Lanxess' sales (Exhibit 6). Since 2013 sales have stabilised and 
EBITDA margins have increased by more than 40% (Exhibit 7).61 As well profitability and 
stability have improved in 2016 (Exhibit 8).62   
 
The JV also proved successful in 2017. Arlanxeo successfully positioned its synthetic rubber 
business between positions 1-3 worldwide. In 2017, Lanxess achieved the best result in its 
corporate history. Lanxess was a reorganized global group that became profitable, stable and 
fast-growing. Moreover, Lanxess stock reached a new high on 9 June 2017 and passed the EUR 
70 mark for the first time. Sales increased by 19,2% and EBITDA pre exceptionals increased 
by 3,2 % for Arlanxeo in 2017 compared to 2016 (Exhibit 9), despite the still challenging 
competitive situation for synthetic rubbers. Arlanxeo made a significant contribution to revenue 
growth, particularly in North America, Latin America, and Asia/Pacific. In any case, sales were 
higher than in the previous year for all regions. Moreover, the cash flow of Arlanxeo also 





3.6 Exhibits Case  
 
Exhibit 1: 
Successful Implementation of Lanxess Acquisitions from 2006-2013 
 
Source: Lanxess AG. (2014). Annual Report 2013. Retrieved on November 7, 2018, from  
https://Lanxess.com/uploads/tx_Lanxessmatrix/lxs_gb13_final_e_web.pdf 
 
Exhibit 2:  
Position Lanxess’s Businesses 
 
Source: Lanxess AG. (2015a). Annual Report 2014. Retrieved on November 10, 2018, from 
https://Lanxess.com/uploads/tx_Lanxessmatrix/lxs_gb2014_e_01.pdf 
 22 
Exhibit 3:  
Key Financial Data Lanxess 2012-2013 
 




Lanxess Stock Performance 2005-2015  
 






Exhibit 5:  
Three-stage efficiency program "Let's LANXESS again" 
 
Source: Lanxess AG. (2017). Annual Report 2016. Retrieved on November 13, 2018, from 
https://Lanxess.com/fileadmin/user_upload/lxs_gb2016_e_Stand_1705.pdf 
 
Exhibit 6:  
Sales by Segment 
 
Source: Lanxess AG. (2018). Annual Report 2017. Retrieved on November 16, 2018, from 
https://Lanxess.com/fileadmin/user_upload/LXS_GB2017_E_web.pdf 
 24 
Exhibit 7:  
EBITDA margin 2011-2016  
 
Source: Baeza et.al. (2017). LANXESS : FORGING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS. Retrieved 
on September 22, 2018, from https://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/transformation-
value-creation-strategy-Lanxess-forging-strategic-partnerships.aspx 
 
Exhibit 8:  
Profitability and Stability  
 




Key data Arlanxeo 
 
















Exhibit 10:  
Cash Flow Arlanxeo 
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This teaching case shows how Lanxess was confronted with a changing industry and the 
associated transformation. More specifically, it demonstrates how a joint venture can help to 
deal with the negative consequences of overcapacity in the industry. A small paragraph before 
the introduction serves to introduce the protagonist of the case, which is the CEO Matthias 
Zachert, and his solution.  
The first section is the introduction, which describes the history and development of Lanxess. 
It shows that Lanxess was very successful until 2012, underscores its good positioning in the 
rubber business and the motivation to expand it. 
The second section deals with various developments in the chemical industry, especially in the 
rubber business. This ranges from investments in capacity to environmental awareness. 
The third section covers the challenges that Lanxess started to face in 2013 and 2014. It also 
provides some key figures from both financial years.  
The forth sections introduce the three-stage efficiency program "Let's LANXESS again". Each 
phase is described in more detail.  
The last section deals with the performance of each phase, but in particular with the last.  
The main goal of this case is to expose students to a real management problem. They should be 
able to identify that the rubber industry became unattractive, understand the implications of 
overcapacity and how a joint venture helped in this situation. Exhibits of the financial data and 
the efficiency program are provided to support the analysis. 
 
4.2 Target audience 
 
The case was developed to be used in class with undergraduate students of business 
administration. The case can be discussed in courses like “strategic planning”, “business 
management” or “international management”.  
 
4.3 Learning objectives  
 
This case serves as an exemplary model for successful transformations. It demonstrates how an 
attractive industry can become unattractive. More precisely, it shows how overcapacity can 
arise and what its consequences and implications are. Students learn how a joint venture can 
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improve a company's competitiveness and thus its profitability in times of overcapacity. They 
also learn that when profitability declines, it is not always the product that causes the problems, 
but the market. In addition, students are shown that a firm doesn’t have to give up a business 
unit immediately if it is going poorly but can take measures that can improve the positioning in 
the market. 
The overall goal is to develop the student’s analytical skills and knowledge in certain areas. 
Therefore, students will be asked in the discussion questions to apply conceptual frameworks. 
To assess the attractiveness of the industry and identify threats to profitability, students will 
learn that Porter five forces, among other things, is a useful tool but not comprehensive. In 
addition, by reading academic papers, students learn that joint ventures can be a step towards 
repositioning a company in the marketplace. However, students should takeaway to critically 
question completed measures. This is to be achieved, among other things, by using the three-
step approach of Capron and Mitchell (2010). Students will evaluate whether a M&A might 
have been a possibility as well.   
 
4.4 Roadmap for discussion 
 
The following roadmap for discussion is designed for a 90 minutes class. The students should 
read the case prior to class so that the full allotted time can be used for the case discussion.  
For this purpose, the instructor should also provide the discussion questions before the class so 
that the students can already take some notes. Students are expected to be familiar with tools 
such as Porter five forces or basic knowledge of joint ventures. However, students can be 
encouraged to read the paper "The use of the industry attractiveness - Business Strength Matrix 
in Strategic Planning" of Hax and Majluf (1983) as additional material in order to make 
discussion in class more effective. This also makes sense as undergraduate students might not 
be that familiar with business context. In addition, the instructor can propose as supplementary 
reading the paper “Joint Ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives” of Kogut (1988).  
To stimulate the subsequent discussion, the instructor can ask the question "who of you knows 
successful or unsuccessful transformations". Students should briefly present them. If the 
students cannot come up with examples, the instructor can present one. For instance, Nokia 
would be a good example, as typically everyone knows this company. The instructor can also 
ask the students to briefly describe Lanxess. This should serve to remind in which industry 
Lanxess operates and which products it manufactures. 
Finally, before the discussion starts, the instructor should invite the students to join together in 
groups of up to 3-4 people, as they will partly work together in teams. When students are 
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exposed to the ideas and views of other students, this helps to gain a better understanding of the 
subject. Now the instructor can start with case discussion.  
The following table represents how much time the instructor should spend on each part. 
 
Activity Content Duration 
Stimulate Discussion Un-/successful transformations, recap of 
Lanxess’ industry 
10 min 
Question on Industry 
Attractiveness  
Tools to assess industry attractiveness 20 min 
Question on Overcapacity Development and implications of overcapacity 20 min 
Question Joint Venture  Strategic logic of joint venture and associated 
downsides, alternatives to joint venture 
30 min 
(15 min each) 
Question on “Let’s 
LANXESS again” 
Effectiveness of the program 5 min 
Wrap up Key takeaways  5 min 
	
 
4.5 Discussion questions 
 
Topic: Industry attractiveness  
Question 1: To what extent can the industry in which Lanxess operates be considered as an 
attractive industry? What threats did Lanxess face?  
 
This question requires students to work in groups. Students should spend 10 minutes on group 
discussion. 10 more minutes are used in class to discuss the results. Since the students have 
been asked to read the paper of Hax & Majluf (1983) prior to class, it is a good task to show 
the students that there are frameworks in place to assess critically the attractiveness of 
industries. Students are expected to recognize that in general, the chemical industry was 
attractive, and still growing, but that there were changes, especially in the rubber business. By 
using Porter’s five forces, students should identify that Lanxess was threatened by new 
competitors and rivalry has increased, making the industry less attractive. Students should take 
away in this exercise that the GE and McKinsey's matrix, take several external factors into 
account, weights them according to their influence and matches Porter's factors among others.  
The threat from new competitors became reality for Lanxess as new ones from emerging 
markets appeared which had the advantage that they did not have to yield any profit for the 
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shareholders. In addition, buyers diversified backward in the supply chain. Students learn here 
that danger of new entrants can also emanate from former customers who have now become 
producers themselves. The companies were forced, as described by Porter (2008), to drop 
prices, which led to a decline in sales and profitability (EBITDA margin). This decline was also 
connected to the increased rivalry. Students thus learn that on the basis of these frameworks the 
threat to profitability can be assessed.  
The most important key takeaway for the students should be that these tools are easy to use but 
not comprehensive enough. For example, the additional capacity/investments, relative 
advantages such as access to new technologies, in this case shale gas, different cost structures 
or changes in raw material prices are not taken into account. In the literature, Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery (1986) and Andrews (1971) discuss some of these aspects. If the students 
themselves do not state that the mentioned factors are missing in the frameworks, the instructor 
should point this out to them.  
 
Topic: Overcapacity 
Question 2: Please explain in detail how overcapacity has occurred and its implications.  
 
Students have 5 minutes to take notes on this question and in a further 15 minutes, the aspects 
are discussed in class. Students should understand the connection in this task that the factors 
that led to the unattractive industry also led to overcapacity.  
As the students in question 1 have already noted, new competitors have entered the market. 
These ones have added new capacity. Porter (1980) and Henderson & Cool (2003) mention in 
the literature that this leads to overcapacity. Furthermore, students should mention that capacity 
was added by existing competitors, mainly through heavy investments by Lanxess. This is the 
second factor Porter mentions that leads to overcapacity. This happens when companies are 
poorly planning their capacity expansions by investing when their competitors invest and there 
is optimism among industry players (Henderson & Cool, 2003). This seems to have been 
exactly the case at Lanxess. Optimism was e.g. triggered by the high demand for rubber. 
However, when demand declined, this contributed to the development of overcapacity.  
It is a good idea to note down on the blackboard the three decisive factors that have contributed 
to the overcapacity. Repeating the key points is a suitable opportunity to get students who have 
not yet taken part in the discussion to do so. 
 
- New capacity through new competitors  
- Additional capacity from existing competitors 
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- Declining demand 
 
Competition in the rubber market has increased as a result of overcapacity. This consequence 
is also described by Porter (2008). The increased competition, in turn, intensified price pressure, 
as it also described in the literature by Kim et al. (2004). According to Kim et al. (2004) and as 
it has happened in the rubber market, competitors have lowered prices in response to the 
increased competition. The second reason why prices had to be lowered were the lower raw 
material prices. The latter two factors led to a decline in sales. According to Porter (2008), 
companies suffer from poorer profitability due to overcapacity. In 2013, Lanxess's EBITDA 
margin declined by an impressive 8.9% in addition to a decline in EBITDA. This is also due to 
write-downs on investments in the rubber business. Moreover, Lanxess also suffered a decline 
in its share price and its creditworthiness was downgraded by rating agencies. The students are 
expected to mention that the structural problems of the industry were in the market and not in 
the product itself. It would again make sense to note the implications on the blackboard. 
 
- Increased competition 
- Intensified price pressure 
- Lower raw material price  
- Lower sales price 
- Decline in sales  
- Decline in profitability (EBITDA margin) 
- Plus: Decline in EBITDA, share price, downgraded creditworthiness 
 
If there is time left, the instructor can also mention that overcapacity typically occurs in older 
capital-intensive industries, such as the industry in which Lanxess is operating (Henderson & 
Cool, 2003; Bower, 2011; Schuler et al., 2014). It leads to long-term value destruction and lasts 
for a long time (Schuler et al., 2014; Porter, 1980). Moreover, investments in Asia that had just 
begun to operate were under pressure. Lanxess had to face higher costs due to unused capacity 








Topic: Joint venture  
Question 3: Please assess the strategic logic of the joint venture. What downsides may be 
associated with this decision? 
 
Before the actual discussion of the task begins, the instructor can ask what a joint venture is 
actually. On the one hand, this is a good repetition, on the other hand, such a soft question is 
good so that every student has the feeling to be able to say something valuable. Students are 
expected to mention that a joint venture is a kind of strategic alliance in which a new company 
is formed (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). In the case of Lanxess, it is a vertical joint venture (Oxley, 
Sampson, & Silverman, 2009), more specifically a buyer-supplier partnership (Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004). The instructor may add, if not already mentioned by students who have read the 
supplementary reading, that the joint venture has as well a strategic objective (Gulati et al., 
2000).  
The discussion should make it clear that Lanxess entered into the joint venture because of the 
significant increase in competition in the rubber market resulting from overcapacity. Lanxess 
felt compelled to improve its competitive position, thus this measure can be seen as strategic 
behaviour. With its partner Saudi Aramco, Lanxess now had access to very competitive raw 
materials in terms of price. Gulati et al. (2000) and Kogut (1988), talk about strategic behaviour 
in the context of strategic alliances, which is partly based on the access to raw materials. This 
is a good opportunity to repeat what strategic behaviour means, namely that companies will act 
in a way that maximizes their profits by improving their competitive position of vis-à-vis 
competitors (Kogut, 1988). It can also be added that oil accounts for 75% of production costs 
and that it is therefore of particular importance for the rubber sector to have a reliable, sufficient 
and secure supply and competitive prices in raw materials. In addition, oil prices were very 
volatile in 2013 and 2014. According to Hagedoorn (1993), strategic behaviour can improve 
market power. Indeed, Arlanxeo (name of the joint venture) successfully positioned its 
synthetic rubber business between positions 1-3 worldwide. McConnell and Nantell (1985) 
have found out that after joint ventures the parents' shares improve. In fact, Lanxess stock 
recovered after the joint venture and rose. The instructor can summarize that the existing price 
pressure could thus be relieved and the cost position (which was poor for Lanxess anyway) 
improved. This enabled the company to improve its competitive position.  
In the second part of this task, the students should mention possible downsides. In the group 
discussion, it should come up that Lanxess could theoretically have committed itself to an 
unproductive relationship or rule out a partnership with other viable companies. (Gulati et al., 
2000). Thus, joint ventures can be accompanied not only by opportunities but also by 
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constraints. In addition, Lanxess can further intensify competition with such a strong partner 
and thereby reduce profitability in the industry (Tong & Reuer, 2010).  
 
Question 4: What could have been another alternative to the joint venture? Why was a joint 
venture probably better? 
 
In this context, it is expected that students will mention on their own initiative that a M&A 
could have been an alternative. This is obvious, since on the one hand, as mentioned in the case, 
there was consolidation pressure and on the other hand it was strategically important for 
Lanxess to integrate backward, as most of its competitors have already done.  
From the discussion, it should emerge that M&A could make sense as it would reduce 
overcapacity and duplication by closing inefficient production sites. However, it can only work 
if synergies are actually created (Bower, 2011; Schuler et al., 2014). The instructor may further 
mention that removing rivals could attract new players. He can ask the students what this could 
lead to. Obviously, capacity is rising again in the industry, so this is a good trigger question to 
test if students have been paying attention.  
In the second part of the task, students have to evaluate why a joint venture was better, i.e. show 
its benefits. As mentioned in the case, Lanxess was able to find with Saudi Aramco a partner to 
share opportunities and risks in the cyclical and highly competitive market for synthetic rubbers. 
Furthermore, Lanxess has noticeably limited the impact of the tire industry on their business 
through the joint venture. The literature also points out that alliances limit their exposure 
compared to M&A (Dyer et al., 2004 as cited in Shanley & Yin, 2015). Furthermore, they offer 
more flexibility since they are easier to leave when needed (Shanley & Yin, 2015). Finally, 
students are expected to mention that M&As are associated with higher costs (Shanley & Yin, 
2015). However, it is important to bear in mind that a company like Saudi Aramco is unlikely 
to be bought because its market value is far too high. In this case, Lanxess would have had to 
find a partner in the area of another raw material.  
This task is a good opportunity for the instructor to present Capron & Mitchell's three-step 
approach which helps to find out the best way for growth through resource developing. It helps 
in deciding whether to enter into a M&A or an alliance. However, students are invited to come 
up with completely different ideas.  
The most important key takeaway should be that such a decision must always be seen and 




Topic: Effectiveness of the program 
Question 5: Do you think the "Let's LANXESS again" program has been effective? What was 
the most important step or were all measures equally important? 
 
Whether the program was generally effective should not be problematic for students to evaluate. 
In the case, there are some indications that "Let's LANXESS again" has developed successfully. 
This includes that the company being better rated again by rating agencies, reaching record 
share level in 2017 and generally achieving the best results in its history. Furthermore, the 
dividend increase was a sign of increased profitability and financial soundness. Moreover, 
EBITDA margins have increased by more than 40%. However, it is difficult to determine how 
much of this is attributable to each phase. Therefore, it would make sense to assess the success 
of each phase individually.  
 
Phase I was certainly effective as it was able to make substantial savings quickly and thus 
finance the programme. Albeit, these measures only served in the short term.  
The measures in phase II could be implemented earlier than expected, which suggests that 
Lanxess is on the right track with this phase. However, the savings in the medium term are not 
expected until 2019. It is therefore difficult to assess how effective this phase is until 2019.  
Thanks to phase III, the rubber business of Lanxess has successfully positioned itself around 
the world, or more precisely between positions 1-3. The joint venture has helped Lanxess to 
grow earlier than expected and Lanxess's finances have also generally improved. In addition, 
the joint venture accounted for 35% of sales in 2016. It should be noted that this success was 
possible because 75 percent of production costs are based on the feedstock oil. Thus, Lanxess 
was able to achieve with the cooperation with Saudi Aramco considerable raw material cost 
advantages. Moreover, since the launch of Arlanxeo, the company has noticeably limited the 
impact of the tire industry on their business (Lanxess AG, 2017). As mentioned in the literature, 
a joint venture can contribute to minimise risk (Porter & Fuller, 1986 as cited in Oxley et al., 
2009). With Saudi Aramco, Lanxess found a strong partner for, with whom they share 
opportunities and risks in the cyclical and highly competitive market for synthetic rubbers 
(Lanxess AG, 2018). 
In summary, phase I was effective in the short term, phase II is at that point problematic to 
assess, and phase III has successfully contributed to Lanxess's growth. Students should 
therefore conclude that phase III was probably the most important step in Lanxess's 
realignment. The instructor can support this by Zachert’s statement "our most important step 
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was the establishment of the Arlanxeo joint venture with Saudi Aramco" (Lanxess AG, p.7, 
2017). 
 
4.6 Wrap up 
After the discussion questions, the instructor can finally summarize the case. In doing so, he 
should mention that Lanxess was confronted with a changing industry, especially in the rubber 
market. New competitors, capacity expansions and falling demand have created overcapacity, 
which has contributed mainly to poorer profitability. Zachert thereupon launched a three-stage 
program, the third stage being the most important for Lanxess. In contrast to the first two stages, 
the third has addressed structural industry characteristics, rather than just the way Lanxess 
operated. The joint venture enabled the rubber business to return to a good positioning and 
increase profitability. However, students should bear in mind that such a decision must always 
be made in the context of the company and that there are other measures that can be successful 
for a realignment.  
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CHAPTER 5: Main Conclusion and Future Research 
 
Main conclusion  
 
In today's highly dynamic and fast-moving world, companies must constantly monitor changes 
in their industry and environment. Research has shown that there are factors that influence the 
attractiveness of an industry. Different approaches and frameworks that take these factors into 
account can be used to assess industry attractiveness. It turns out that these factors can threaten 
profitability. This thesis deals with the fact that factors such as new competitors, capacity 
expansions and declining demand increasingly reduce industry attractiveness, results in 
overcapacity and put profitability under pressure. This leads to an ever-increasing competition 
and consolidation pressure. Companies that want to compete in the market are forced to 
improve their competitive position. One way to do this is to enter into a joint venture. This can 
significantly improve the position in the industry and thus the company can return to 
profitability. Alternative solutions such as M&As are also being evaluated. 
In order to combine theory with practice, a real-life example was chosen that had to face the 
problems mentioned in the literature but succeeded in achieving a successful turnaround. 
Lanxess is an excellent example, which had recorded a decline in its performance in 2013 and 
2014 but took measures very quickly. The rubber business was affected by overcapacity and 
had to be repositioned. With Saudi Aramco, which secured access to raw materials at a very 
competitive price, Lanxess found a partner for its backward integration. The joint venture 
successfully positioned itself worldwide and made a significant contribution to the 
transformation of Lanxess. The topicality and originality of Lanxess are intended to arouse 
readers' interest and contribute to learning success. 
The main conclusion of this thesis is that a joint venture can actually help combat the negative 
consequences of overcapacity in a changing industry. However, such a measure is always case-




In this work, recommendations were given on how to deal with overcapacity in the industry. 
However, only the chemical industry was considered. In other industries, the overcapacity can 
have other root causes, e.g. in the fish industry. In this case, a joint venture would hardly be 
helpful and other recommendations would make more sense. It is also unclear whether similar 
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recommendations can be projected onto other mature industries that are more similar to the 
chemical industry as steel or container shipping. 
In addition, factors that might have had a positive impact on the rubber business were not taken 
into account. These could include, for example, exchange rates or government intervention. In 
a more detailed investigation, such factors could be included to assess their impact. 
As mentioned in the thesis, overcapacity typically lasts a long time and leads to long-term value 
destruction. Additionally, a joint venture serves generally as a long-term strategy. However, in 
this work, the development could only be analysed until the year 2017. In the future, the impact 
would have to be reassessed to determine whether a joint venture in an industry with 
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